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"We do not ‘find out’ who or what an employee (legally speaking) is. It 
is open for us as a society to decide."1  
"In the law, there has always been a difference, and a big difference, 
between ‘employees’ and ‘independent contractors.’"2 
1. Guy Davidov, The Reports of My Death are Greatly Exaggerated: "Employee" As 
a Viable (Though Overly-Used) Legal Concept, in BOUNDARIES AND FRONTIERS OF LABOUR 
LAW: GOALS AND MEANS IN THE REGULATION OF WORK 133, 144 (Guy Davidov & Brian 
Langille eds., 2006). 
2. H.R. Rep. No. 80-245, at 18 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 309 (reprt. 1985). 
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I. Introduction 
Where legal rights and protections are concerned, the difference 
between employees and independent contractors in American labor and 
employment law is monumental. Employees are protected by numerous 
statutes, from state workers’ compensation laws to the Fair Labor Standards 
Act; independent contractors are not.3  Unfortunately, as a matter of 
classification, the difference can be elusive. 	In fact, "[t]here are 
innumerable situations . . . where it is difficult to say whether a particular 
individual is an employee or an independent contractor."4  Truckers, 
construction workers, package deliverers, taxi drivers, freelance artists, 
engineers, and many other types of workers may exhibit some 
characteristics associated with employee status, but in other ways resemble 
independent contractors.5  In such borderline cases, the courts have 
generally failed to articulate convincingly just what the distinction should 
be.6  Thus the perennial question of how the law should classify workers "in 
the borderland between what is clearly an employer-employee relationship 
and what is clearly one of independent entrepreneurial dealing"7  stubbornly 
remains unsettled despite decades of debate in the courts, legislatures, and 
journals.8 
Before the last century, this controversy was largely confined to the 
realm of tort law and the question of a master’s vicarious liability for the 
3. See Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Our Nation’s Forgotten Workers: The Unprotected 
Volunteers, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 147, 159 (2006) (providing citations to statutes which 
rely on the employee/independent contractor distinction). These statutes include the 
National Labor Relations Act, Fair Labor Standards Act, Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act, the Internal Revenue Code, Family and Medical Leave Act, Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, Title VII, Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and Americans with Disabilities 
Act, as well as various state employment statutes. Id. 
4. NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968). 
5. See, e.g., Katherine V.W. Stone, Legal Protections for Atypical Employees: 
Employment Law for Workers Without Workplaces and Employees Without Employers, 27 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 251, 279–80 (2006) ("[M]any low-paid employees such as 
janitors, truck loaders, typists, and building cleaners have been classified as independent 
contractors even when they are retained by large companies to work on a regular basis."). 
6. See Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It Sees 
One and How It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 338–53 (2001) 
(pointing out the problems with each of the generally accepted agency factors which purport 
to distinguish between employees and independent contractors). 
7. NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, 322 U.S. 111, 121 (1944). 
8. See id. at 121 n.20 (citing law review articles from the late 1930s for the 
proposition that the employee/independent contractor distinction has been a complicated 
one). 
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conduct of a servant.9  In the early 1900s, however, Congress adopted the 
employee/independent contractor distinction to define the coverage of New 
Deal-era statutes designed to protect workers.10  Employee/independent 
contractor status determinations frequently have been the subject of 
litigation—and less commonly legislation—ever since.11  In recent decades, 
the number of workers encompassed by the independent contractor label 
has steadily grown, as businesses have consciously restructured the work 
relationship away from the employment model to escape social 
responsibilities and achieve greater flexibility in a globalized economy.12 
In the present economic downturn, this trend has accelerated significantly.13 
This shift to independent contractor status in many cases consists, at 
the most basic level, of allowing workers to pay for the opportunity to work 
rather than paying them wages.14  The janitor who purchases a franchise to 
clean part of a building15  or the taxi driver who leases a cab for twelve- or 
9. See Carlson, supra note 6, at 302–06 (outlining the pre-industrial origins of 
master-servant law). 
10. See MARC LINDER, THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW: A 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 134 (1989) [hereinafter THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP] (stating 
that one line of vicarious liability cases, "which came to be called the common-law control 
test, . . . ultimately entered into the workers’ compensation statutes in Britain and the United 
States in the beginning of the twentieth century and thence to the social-economic legislation 
of the New Deal"). 
11. See infra Part II (summarizing the history of the classification in the context of the 
National Labor Relations Act). 
12. See Stephen F. Befort, Presentation, The Regulatory Void of Contingent Work, 10 
EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 245, 247–48 (2006) (explaining the incentives behind businesses’ 
growing use of the independent contractor model, and contingent work arrangements 
generally). 
13. See Sarah Johnson, Cracking Down on Independent Contractors, CFO, (Mar. 3, 
2010), http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/14480567/c_14480391?f=home_todayinfinance (last 
visited Feb. 16, 2011) ("[T]he issue has become more pressing because of the increased use 
of contract workers by companies wanting to introduce more flexibility in their labor costs in 
the wake of the downturn. That trend is expected to continue.") (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
14. See Jonathan P. Hiatt & Lee W. Jackson, Union Survival Strategies for the 
Twenty-First Century, 12 LAB. LAW. 165, 177 (1996) [hereinafter Union Survival] 
(discussing employer strategies which "create large new classes of ‘independent 
contractors’"). Although they are on the rise, such practices are, of course, nothing new in 
American labor relations. See, e.g., George Gonos, Evolution of the Law on Temporary 
Work in America, 10 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 234, 236–37 (2006) (discussing early-
twentieth-century "shark agencies," which split fees with employers to keep workers paying 
indefinitely to take on brief work assignments). 
15. See Union Survival, supra note 14, at 177 (providing an example of a cleaning 
contractor selling "‘franchises’ for the right to clean floors of downtown office buildings . . . 
[to] low-wage janitors"). 
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sixteen-hour stretches16  looks little different from a full-time employee 
doing the same work. Yet such arrangements deprive millions of low-skill, 
low-income workers17  of important rights and protections that the law 
grants only to employees.18  This Note focuses on recent developments and 
proposals for change regarding one specific statutory right—collective 
bargaining through a union—which is enjoyed by fewer and fewer 
American workers. 
A. Worker Classification Is a Critically Important Issue in Today’s 
Economy 
At the same time that growing numbers of Americans lack legal 
protections at work, labor, employment, and tax laws frequently leave 
businesses uncertain about how to classify their personnel properly.19 
Ambiguities in the law provide tremendous incentives for employers to 
manipulate work relationships to avoid the appearance of actual 
employment, err on the side of classifying workers as independent 
contractors, or deliberately and illegally misclassify employees as 
contractors.20 	Businesses that engage in questionable classification 
practices in gray areas of the economy21  enjoy an unfair cost advantage 
over the competition.22  The penalties and litigation costs, however, are 
increasingly severe, resulting from class action lawsuits, IRS audits, or 
16. See Michael Levenson, Taxi Drivers Push for Fare Increase, BOSTON GLOBE, June 
2, 2008, at A1 (explaining the leasing arrangements of most Boston taxi drivers). 
17. See Stone, supra note 5, at 254 ("As of 2005, there were over ten million 
independent contractors, comprising 8.4% of the labor force."); Steven Greenhouse, A 
Crackdown on "Contractors" as a Tax Dodge, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2010, at A1 ("One 
federal study concluded that employers illegally passed off 3.4 million regular workers as 
contractors, while the Labor Department estimates that up to [thirty] percent of companies 
misclassify employees."). 
18. See Stone, supra note 5, at 280 ("Independent contractors are not covered by the 
minimum wage, workers’ compensation, unemployment compensation, occupational safety 
and health laws, collective bargaining laws, Social Security, disability, [or] anti-
discrimination laws . . . ."). 
19. See infra Part II (discussing the lack of clarity in this field of law). 
20. See Greenhouse, supra note 17, at A1 (describing misclassification practices). 
21. See infra Part III.A. (discussing the use of independent contractors by FedEx). 
22. See, e.g., Greenhouse, supra note 17, at A1 (quoting Ohio Attorney General 
Richard Cordray’s estimate that misclassification "can mean a [twenty] or [thirty] percent 
cost difference per worker"); Donnelle Eller, Workers Misclassified, Probe Finds, DES 
MOINES REG., Feb. 12, 2010, at B8 ("[E]mployers who misclassify workers create ‘an unfair 
playing field by lowering their costs of doing business . . . .’"). 
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actions brought by state attorneys general.23  Strict enforcement efforts are 
being driven by the federal and state governments’ financial difficulties in a 
time of recession;24  President Obama’s 2011 proposed budget, for example, 
includes $25 million to hire additional Department of Labor personnel "to 
identify and penalize employers who improperly misclassify employees as 
independent contractors."25  As a result, the rules governing worker status 
have become as important to businesses as they are to workers 
themselves.26 
In the labor context, the battles over worker classification among 
workers, employers, unions, and government agencies are fought before the 
National Labor Relations Board and the federal courts of appeals "against a 
background of barely reconcilable precedents and . . . a failure of the Labor 
Board to provide a reasoned basis for its decisions regarding the definition 
of ‘employee.’"27  Although the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) was 
enacted in 1935 with the broad purpose of encouraging collective 
bargaining and protecting workers’ right to organize,28  the definition of 
protected employees provided by Section 2(3) of the NLRA is unhelpfully 
tautological: With a few listed exceptions, an employee is simply "any 
employee."29  The legal tests which have emerged to fill this legislative gap 
23. See Todd D. Saveland, FedEx’s New "Employees": Their Disgruntled 
Independent Contractors, 36 TRANSP. L.J. 95, 111–16 (2009) (discussing multi-million 
dollar class-action and tax judgments against FedEx for misclassification of workers). 
24. See Greenhouse, supra note 17, at A1 ("Federal and state officials, many facing 
record budget deficits, are starting to aggressively pursue companies that try to pass off 
regular employees as independent contractors."). 
25. See President’s Budget Fact Sheet: Department of Labor, WHITEHOUSE.GOV, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/factsheet_department_labor (last visited Feb. 16, 2011) 
(summarizing fiscal year 2011 budget proposals for the Department of Labor) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
26. See Greenhouse, supra note 17, at A1 (quoting the Ohio Attorney General’s 
assertion that "[l]aw-abiding businesses are in many ways the biggest fans of increased 
enforcement"). 
27. See Local 814, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 512 F.2d 564, 570 (D.C. Cir. 
1975) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (criticizing inconsistent 
determinations of worker status by the NLRB). 
28. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006) ("It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United 
States to . . . encourag[e] . . . collective bargaining and . . . protect[] the exercise by workers 
of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their 
own choosing . . . ."). 
29. See id. § 152(3) (defining "employee"). The definition, in pertinent part, is as 
follows: 
The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the 
employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states 
otherwise . . . but shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural 
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over the seventy-five years since the NLRA was enacted have not made the 
matter much clearer.30 
B. It Can Be Done Better 
It is hardly novel to argue that the current legal regime for determining 
coverage under the NLRA, as well as other remedial labor and employment 
statutes, urgently requires legislative reform in the direction of greater 
worker coverage.31  Unfortunately, however, Congress is unlikely to act 
appropriately in the near future.32  In Part IV, this Note nevertheless calls 
for legislative action and points out several ways for federal or state 
legislatures to alter or abolish the independent contractor/employee 
distinction in order to expand collective bargaining eligibility and thereby 
better realize the purposes of the National Labor Relations Act.33  
Meanwhile, in light of congressional abdication, the responses of the 
courts and the National Labor Relations Board become all the more crucial. 
In Part II, this Note provides an overview of these responses and the 
common-law tests which have emerged since the enactment of the NLRA.34 
The discussion moves, then, to an important development in the law, 
illustrated by two recent decisions, FedEx Home Delivery and Friendly Cab 
Co., in which United States circuit courts have struggled to revise the 
historically applied agency test by emphasizing the role of entrepreneurial 
potential in the analysis.35 
laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any 
individual employed by his parent or spouse, or any individual having the status 
of an independent contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor . . . . 
Id. 
30. See infra Part II (discussing the history of judicial and agency interpretation of the 
NLRA’s coverage). 
31. See infra Part IV.A (discussing proposals for legislative reform). 
32. See Steven Greenhouse, Democrats Drop Key Part of Bill to Assist Unions, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 17, 2009, at A1 (discussing the slow pace of possible union election reform 
legislation). This lack of interest or ability to address workers’ issues is illustrated perhaps 
most clearly by the failure of a significant Democratic congressional majority, under a 
president elected with massive union support, to remedy deep flaws in the organizing and 
election process. See id. (noting the Democratic majority and President Obama’s support for 
reform). 
33. See infra Part IV (arguing for legislative solutions). 
34. See infra Part II (discussing central cases). 
35. See Mitchell H. Rubinstein, D.C. Circuit Issues Major Decision Defining 
Employee Status Under NLRA, ADJUNCT LAW PROF BLOG (Apr. 23, 2009), http://law 
professors.typepad.com/adjunctprofs/employement_law/page/12/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2011) 
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This Note critiques that revision and proposes a further evolution in 
the Board’s application of common-law agency principles, focusing more 
heavily on individual, worker-by-worker analysis. Under this suggested 
approach, in cases in which entrepreneurial activities draw some borderline 
workers over the threshold into independent contractor territory,36  the 
Board should differentiate between these individual independent 
businesspeople and their coworkers who may, in fact, still function as 
common-law employees. In the absence of meaningful reconsideration at 
the legislative level, this approach has the potential to mitigate some of the 
arbitrariness and inconsistency of current law. 
II. Hard Cases and Bad Law: A Short History of Independent Contractors 
and Employees Under the National Labor Relations Act 
Worker classification under the NLRA has lacked clarity from the 
statute’s enactment to the present day.37  In what is perhaps an inherently 
imprecise inquiry,38  the multi-factor, flexible test which has been used in 
various permutations since the beginning has resisted consistent 
application.39  The potential for unpredictable results is particularly great 
(questioning "whether or not this ‘entrepreneurial opportunity test’ [i]s a new test or just an 
off shoot of the common law test" and calling for law review commentary on this question) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). This Note rejects the relevance of the 
common law to the issue at hand, viz., the scope of protective labor legislation, and thus 
largely does not concern itself with the FedEx Home Delivery test’s common law bona fides 
or lack thereof. Interestingly, however, "agency law, as embodied in the Restatement, does 
not refer to any explicit indicia of entrepreneurial freedom." See Marc Linder, Towards 
Universal Worker Coverage under the National Labor Relations Act: Making Room for 
Uncontrolled Employees, Dependent Contractors, and Employee-Like Persons, 66 U. DET. 
L. REV. 555, 568 (1989) [hereinafter Universal Worker Coverage] (using a chart to compare 
the factors listed by the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220, the Supreme Court, and 
Congress in the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act). 
36. See FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 497 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
(describing entrepreneurial opportunity as "an important animating principle" in close cases). 
37. See Ruth Burdick, Principles of Agency Permit the NLRB to Consider Additional 
Factors of Entrepreneurial Independence and the Relative Dependence of Employees When 
Determining Independent Contractor Status Under Section 2(3), 15 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. 
L.J. 75, 93–110 (1997) (discussing early independent contractor cases under the Act). 
38. See Davidov, supra note 1, at 145 & n.38 (arguing that "the concept of ‘employee’ 
is more a ‘standard’ than a ‘rule’" and "[s]ome degree of uncertainty is thus unavoidable"). 
39. See, e.g., FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 496 ("[T]he Restatement’s non-
exhaustive ten-factor test is not especially amenable to any sort of bright-line rule, a long-
recognized rub." (footnote omitted)). The following provision is the one generally cited in 
worker classification cases under the NLRA: 
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because each factor in the test may be entitled to different weight in 
different factual circumstances.40  Moreover, the cases which reach 
appellate courts are generally ambiguous: Although most workers "will fall 
clearly on one side or on the other, by whatever test may be applied[,] . . . 
there will be many, the incidents of whose employment partake in part of 
the one group, in part of the other, in varying proportions of weight."41  For 
these close cases, outcomes may vary from company to company or district 
42 to district. In adopting an amorphous "totality of the circumstances" test, 
theoretically grounded in the common law but lacking any unifying 
principle beyond perhaps "control," the Board and appellate courts in recent 
decades appeared to have made their peace with this measure of 
(1) A servant is a person employed to perform services in the affairs of another 
and who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the services 
is subject to the other’s control or right to control. 
(2) In determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an independent 
contractor, the following matters of fact, among others, are considered: 
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over 
the details of the work; 
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or 
business; 
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is 
usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without 
supervision; 
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation; 
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, 
and the place of work for the person doing the work; 
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed; 
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; 
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the employer; 
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of master and 
servant; and 
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business. 
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220 (1958). 
40. See Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 842, 850 (1998) ("[Al]though the 
same factor may be present in different cases, it may be entitled to unequal weight in each 
because the factual background leads to an analysis that makes that factor more meaningful 
in one case than in the other."). 
41. NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, 322 U.S. 111, 127 (1944). 
42. See, e.g., NLRB v. Friendly Cab Co., 512 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(declaring taxi drivers to be employees despite a prior finding that a competitor’s similar 
drivers were independent contractors); Corporate Express Delivery Sys. v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 
777, 781 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (finding truck drivers to be employees despite a prior finding that 
drivers under a similar contract with the same company were independent contractors). 
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unpredictability, uncertainty, and arbitrariness.43  As the following section 
explains, this was not always the case. 
A. Hearst Publications, the Taft-Hartley Act, and United Insurance Co.: 
The Establishment of the Common Law Agency Test 
In the early years of the NLRA, the courts endeavored to define 
coverage with some awareness of why they were doing so.44  In the midst of 
a "labor law field . . . littered with judicial decisions which seem 
inconsistent with the language, purpose, and the legislative history of the 
National Labor Relations Act,"45  NLRB v. Hearst Publications stands out as 
a judicial attempt to rationally and deliberately address the NLRA’s 
coverage. In Hearst Publications, the Supreme Court determined that 
"newsboys," men who worked full time distributing Los Angeles 
newspapers, were employees covered by the Act and thus permitted to 
unionize.46  In arriving at this conclusion, the Court dedicated much of its 
decision to rejecting the employer’s proposed standard, which would vary 
according to each state’s common law.47  Emphasizing the national nature 
of labor issues, the Court rejected this approach, along with the idea that 
states’ common law principles could be productively distilled into a 
workable national standard.48  Ultimately, the Court found that regardless of 
43. See infra Part II.A–B (discussing landmark decisions in this area). 
44. See Hearst Publ’ns, 322 U.S. at 127 ("[I]t cannot be irrelevant that the particular 
workers in these cases are subject, as a matter of economic fact, to the evils the statute was 
designed to eradicate and that the remedies it affords are appropriate for preventing them or 
curing their harmful effects . . . ."); Marc Linder, Dependent and Independent Contractors in 
Recent U.S. Labor Law: An Ambiguous Dichotomy Rooted in Simulated Statutory 
Purposelessness, 21 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 187, 192 n.23 (1999) [hereinafter Simulated 
Statutory Purposelessness] (discussing the foregoing quotation from Hearst Publications). 
45. See James Atleson, Confronting Judicial Values: Rewriting the Law of Work in a 
Common Law System, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 435, 436 (1997) (arguing for labor law reform to be 
shielded from "subver[sion] by a hostile or indifferent judiciary or National Labor Relations 
Board"). 
46. See Hearst Publ’ns, 322 U.S. at 113–19 (discussing the newsboys’ work 
arrangement); id. at 131–32 (upholding the Board’s determination that they were 
employees). 
47. Id. at 123 ("Both the terms and the purposes of the statute, as well as the 
legislative history, show that Congress had in mind no such patchwork plan for securing 
freedom of employees’ organization and of collective bargaining."). 
48. Id. at 125–26 ("Congress no more intended to import this mass of technicality as a 
controlling ‘standard’ for uniform national application than to refer decision of the question 
outright to the local law."). 
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how a technical common-law analysis might decide the case, the purposes 
of preserving industrial peace and protecting dependent workers who 
lacked bargaining power mandated employee status for the newsboys.49 
Although the result of Hearst Publications likely would have been the 
same under any application of agency law principles,50  Congress acted to 
restrict the Court’s interpretation of the statute in the Taft-Hartley Act of 
1947.51 	The confusion which has always characterized 
employee/independent contractor jurisprudence is reflected in the 
legislative history of the Act:52  Convinced that the Board and the Court had 
deliberately ignored the one simple, correct answer, the House Report 
declared that "according to the understanding of almost everyone, with the 
exception of members of the National Labor Relations Board, [‘employee’] 
means someone who works for another for hire."53  "[T]here has always 
been a difference, and a big difference," the Report insisted, "between 
‘employees’ and ‘independent contractors.’"54  Because the amendment 
49. See id. at 128 ("[W]hen the . . . economic facts of the relation make it more nearly 
one of employment than of independent business enterprise with respect to the ends sought 
to be accomplished by the legislation, those characteristics may outweigh technical legal 
classification . . . ."). 
50. See Carlson, supra note 6, at 316 (applying factors of agency law to the case’s 
facts). 
51. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, sec. 101, § 2(3), 61 
Stat. 136, 137–38 (1947) (adding to § 2(3) of the NLRA an explicit exclusion for 
"independent contractors," but not defining the term in any way). 
52. See Burdick, supra note 37, at 114 (arguing that the House Committee Report 
misstates and oversimplifies the law, disregarding "‘literally thousands of decisions . . . 
revealing an infinite number of varying and inconsistent applications of the tests’" of 
employee status (quoting Joseph M. Jacobs, Are "Independent Contractors" Really 
Independent?, 3 DEPAUL L. REV. 23, 27 (1953))). Moreover, the test or definition provided 
by the House Committee Report states only a few of the common-law factors, making it 
"inconsistent with the very principles of agency that the House instructs the Board to 
follow." Id. at 117. 
53. See Carlson, supra note 6, at 321 (providing an overview of Taft-Hartley’s 
legislative history (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 80-245, at 3020 (1947))). 
54. See id. at 322 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 80-245, at 3020). Disregarding the factors 
that actually delineated this difference according to the Restatement, the House Report 
seemingly collected a sampling of factors which the drafters believed to comport with 
common sense: 
"Employees" work for wages or salaries under direct supervision. "Independent 
contractors" undertake to do a job for a price, decide how the work will be done, 
usually hire others to do the work, and depend for their income not upon wages, 
but upon the difference between what they pay for goods, materials and labor 
and what they receive for the end result, that is upon profits. 
See Universal Worker Coverage, supra note 35, at 567–68 (quoting and critiquing the House 
Report). 
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provided scathing criticism but no clear legal guidance, scholars have 
contested the proper interpretation of the Taft-Hartley changes ever since.55 
Of course, the purpose-oriented approach which so enraged Congress 
in 1947 was not created from scratch in Hearst Publications: "[J]udges 
have been using it as a canon of statutory construction for more than 400 
years."56  Moreover, "[d]efinition at common law was (or should have been) 
as purposive as it was in Hearst Publications."57  Generally speaking, its 
purpose was to allocate tort liability to the party in the best position to 
prevent tortious injuries and distribute their costs.58  This means that courts 
strictly contemplating the common law test in the NLRA context are not 
avoiding the use of purpose; rather, by applying tort-based definitions to 
determine the coverage of labor statutes, they are simply applying the 
wrong purpose.59  Nevertheless, subsequent Supreme Court decisions have 
clearly articulated the doctrine that the disembodied principles of the 
common law of agency must provide the exclusive rule of decision.60 
55. See, e.g., Archibald Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 
1947, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6 (1947) ("[T]he amendment should be interpreted simply as a 
cautionary measure, reflecting a belief that the courts and Board had gone too far in treating 
small businessmen as employees, . . . but without importing the technical agency concepts 
developed to meet a quite different problem."). 
56. Simulated Statutory Purposelessness, supra note 44, at 193; see also infra Part IV 
(discussing Judge Learned Hand’s consideration of statutory purpose in determining 
workers’ compensation coverage). 
57. See Brian A. Langille & Guy Davidov, Beyond Employees and Independent 
Contractors: A View from Canada, 21 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 7, 14 (1999) [hereinafter 
Beyond Employees] (arguing that context is essential for any interpretation of statutory 
terms); see also NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, 322 U.S. 111, 120 n.19 (1944) ("[E]ven at the 
common law the control test and the complex of incidents evolved in applying it to 
distinguish an ‘employee’ from an ‘independent contractor,’ for purposes of vicarious 
liability in tort, did not necessarily have the same significance in other contexts . . . ."). 
58. See infra note 214 and accompanying text (discussing the common-law origins of 
the independent contractor/employee distinction). 
59. See THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP, supra note 10, at 135 ("Since [labor 
protective statutes] were designed to mitigate the harshness of the common law . . . , little 
plausibility attaches to the use of nineteenth-century agency law as a reliable standard of 
eligibility for membership on the employee side of modern industrial combat."). 
60. See NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968) ("The obvious 
purpose of [the Taft-Hartley] amendment was to have the [National Labor Relations] Board 
and the courts apply general agency principles in distinguishing between employees and 
independent contractors under the Act."); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 
325 (1992) (reaffirming that congressional intent forecloses courts from interpreting 
employee status based on "the mischief to be corrected and the end to be attained" by the 
statute in question (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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B. The Board’s Shifting Focus 
Following Taft-Hartley, the NLRB focused intently on one thread of 
employee/independent contractor common law which emphasized, above 
all, the purported employer’s right to control the means and manner of the 
worker’s performance as the touchstone of the employment relationship.61  
Under this test, each common-law factor is weighed, essentially, only to the 
extent that it bears on the employer’s exercise, ability, or incentive to 
control the physical means and manner of the worker’s performance.62  In 
recent years, however, the potentially bizarre results of this test provoked 
the Board to subtly adjust course.63  
The Board’s shifting analysis began to appear in cases like Roadway 
Package System, Inc. (Roadway III),64  which was the third case in ten years 
in which the Board declared that pickup and delivery drivers working for 
Roadway, a nationwide package delivery company, were employees.65  In 
61. See Steinberg & Co., 78 N.L.R.B. 211, 220–21 (1948) (determining that the Board 
"should follow the ‘ordinary tests of the law of agency’ [and a]pparently, the test thus 
contemplated is the familiar ‘right-of-control test’" (footnote omitted)); see also THE 
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP, supra note 10, at 134 (describing two strands of common-law 
cases). One strand "concentrated on the relative skill and expertise of the two parties and the 
related factor of the integration of the worker’s activity into the employer’s business" and the 
other "focused exclusively on the narrow notion of physical control, relegating all other 
factors to the subordinate role of evidentiary indicia of control." Id. 
62. See, e.g., NLRB v. Friendly Cab Co., 512 F.3d 1090, 1097 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding 
a strong inference against control when taxicab drivers pay fixed rental rates because an 
employer receiving the same payment regardless of how drivers perform has less incentive 
to control the means and manner of their work). 
63. See Simulated Statutory Purposelessness, supra note 44, at 200–01 (criticizing the 
application of a strict right-of-control test in Aurora Packing Co. v. NLRB, 904 F.2d 73, 76 
(D.C. Cir. 1990)). In Aurora Packing, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit found that rabbinically trained kosher cow slaughterers ("schoctim") who 
carried out sixty percent of Aurora’s slaughtering were not employees because the company, 
unversed in Orthodox Jewish law, could not control "the ‘means and manner’ of the 
schoctim’s job performance." See Aurora Packing Co., 904 F.2d at 76 (applying the right-
of-control test). In so finding, the court rejected the Board’s emphasis on the fact that the 
schoctim, who had all voted to unionize, were an essential, integrated part of the company’s 
business whose income was entirely determined by how many cows the company chose to 
send to slaughter each day. See id. at 76–77 (finding that these factors did not create 
independent contractor status). 
64. See Roadway Package Sys., Inc. (Roadway III), 326 N.L.R.B. 842, 854 (1998) 
(concluding that package delivery drivers who owned and operated their trucks were 
employees, not independent contractors). 
65. See Saveland, supra note 23, at 102 (discussing Roadway Package System 
(Roadway I), 288 N.L.R.B. 196 (1988), Roadway Package System (Roadway II), 292 
N.L.R.B. 376 (1989), and Roadway Package System (Roadway III), 326 N.L.R.B. 842 
(1998)). 
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Roadway III, the Board determined that, although the company had granted 
its drivers a theoretical proprietary interest in their delivery routes as well as 
the right to use their trucks for independent ventures, they remained 
employees.66  In arriving at its conclusion, the Board analyzed a variety of 
traditional agency factors.67  Roadway III purported to reject not only a 
"‘right to control’ test which mistakenly emphasizes minor details," but the 
very idea that control should predominate over other common-law factors.68 
Yet Roadway III did not fully repudiate the control-based analysis: 
Framing its discussion, the Board said that although "the common-law 
agency test described by the Restatement ultimately assesses the amount or 
degree of control exercised by an employing entity over an individual, we 
find insufficient basis for the proposition that those factors which do not 
include the concept of ‘control’ are insignificant."69  Subsequent decisions 
confirmed that, rather than abolishing the right to control test, "[t]he 
Roadway Board, as had the Supreme Court, took care to strike a balance 
between the ‘right of control’ factor and the flexible, multifactor 
approach."70 
III. Recent Evolution of the Common Law Agency Test 
In 1998, Roadway Package System was purchased by FedEx 
Corporation and became FedEx Ground Package System, Inc.71  Like its 
predecessor, FedEx operates in an area of the economy particularly prone to 
close cases and allegations of misclassification.72  Also like Roadway, 
66. See Roadway III, 326 N.L.R.B. at 843 (finding drivers to be employees in spite of 
Roadway’s contractual changes). 
67. See id. at 851–53 (applying various factors derived from the common law and 
NLRB v. United Insurance Co. of America, 390 U.S. 254, 259 (1968)). 
68. See id. at 850 (stating that the Board must "consider all the incidents of the 
individual’s relationship to the employing entity") (internal quotation marks omitted). 
69. Id. (emphasis added). 
70. See., e.g., St. Joseph News-Press and Teamsters Union Local 460, 345 N.L.R.B. 
474, 478 (2005) (applying Roadway in finding newspaper deliverers to be independent 
contractors). 
71. See FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 495 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
(discussing the FedEx business model). 
72. See Universal Worker Coverage, supra note 35, at 556 (noting that "traditional 
indicia of control [are] ambiguous and thus amenable to contractual manipulation by 
imaginative employers," for "transportation workers, in particular so-called lessee taxicab 
drivers and truck drivers"); see also Thomas M. Murray, Note, Independent Contractor or 
Employee? Misplaced Reliance on Actual Control Has Disenfranchised Artistic Workers 
Under the National Labor Relations Act, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 303, 325 (1998) 
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FedEx has shown itself to be deeply committed to the independent 
contractor business model.73  Roadway had never succeeded in modifying 
its relationship with drivers sufficiently to make the Board consider them 
independent contractors,74  but the legal environment seemed to shift in 
2002 with Corporate Express Delivery Systems v. NLRB.75  In Corporate 
Express, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
upheld as reasonable the Board’s decision explicitly "to focus not upon the 
employer’s control of the means and manner of the work but instead upon 
whether the putative independent contractors have ‘a significant 
entrepreneurial opportunity for gain or loss.’"76  Four years after Corporate 
Express, when FedEx Home Delivery drivers in Massachusetts petitioned 
for a union election, the company made its case again in FedEx Home 
Delivery v. NLRB.77 
A. FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB: From Right to Control to 
Entrepreneurial Potential 
1. Factual Background 
FedEx Home Delivery is among the most recent of many battles in an 
ongoing feud between the International Brotherhood of Teamsters and 
FedEx over the company’s classification of its drivers.78  The case began 
("The dominant cases interpreting the control test have been taxi and truck driver cases."). 
73. See Jon Coppelman, FedEx in MA: Buying Time, WORKER’S COMP INSIDER (Sept. 
13, 2010) http://www.workerscompinsider.com/2010/09/fedex-in-ma-buy.html (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2011) ("FedEx maintains a steadfast commitment to a business model for its ground 
delivery system where the work is performed by independent contractors.") (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
74. See Burdick, supra note 37, at 85 (noting that "Roadway admit[ed] that it had 
Roadway I specifically ‘in mind’ when it drafted the 1994 contract" at issue in Roadway III). 
Ms. Burdick argues that the Roadway III "stands as an example of an employer classification 
scheme designed to convert a segment of employees to independent contractors and thereby 
avoid the unionization and collective bargaining desired by its employees." Id. at 86. 
75. See Corporate Express Delivery Sys. v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 777, 781 (D.C. Cir. 
2002) (upholding a Board finding of employee status for owner-operator truck drivers based 
primarily on the employer’s restrictions on the rights of drivers to employ others or use their 
vehicles for other jobs). 
76. Id. at 780. 
77. See FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 495 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
(discussing the procedural background of the case). 
78. See Steven Greenhouse, Drivers May Not Join Union at FedEx Home, Court 
Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2009, at B3 ("The ruling was FedEx Home’s biggest victory in a 
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with FedEx Home Delivery drivers in the town of Wilmington, 
Massachusetts who joined a union to negotiate with FedEx regarding hours 
and pay.79  In July 2006, a Teamsters local union based in Boston80  filed 
petitions with the National Labor Relations Board for representation 
elections for the drivers at two Wilmington delivery terminals.81  A 
Regional Director for the NLRB determined that the drivers were statutory 
employees,82  with the exception of three multiple-route deliverers, whom 
the Director classified as "supervisors" because of the subordinate drivers 
they employed. 83  Accordingly, these multi-route deliverers were excluded 
from the bargaining unit.84  The NLRB rejected FedEx’s request to review 
the Regional Director’s finding of employee status,85  and the drivers voted 
for the Union twenty-four to eight on October 20, 2006.86  Nearly eight 
series of disputes with the Teamsters union, class-action lawyers and state officials over 
whether it had misclassified its drivers as contractors rather than employees to deny them 
various benefits and the right to unionize."); ERIN JOHANSSON, AM. RIGHTS AT WORK, FEDUP 
WITH FEDEX: HOW FEDEX GROUND TRAMPLES WORKERS’ RIGHTS AND CIVIL RIGHTS 20 
(2007), available at http://www.civilrights.org/publications/fedex/fedupwithfedex.pdf (citing 
NLRB decisions finding FedEx drivers to be employees in five Teamsters organizing 
campaigns at east coast FedEx facilities since 2004). 
79. See Moira Herbst, Big Labor’s Big Chance, BUS. WK., Sept. 8, 2008, at 26 (stating 
that some workers "felt management was ignoring their concerns about long shifts and 
unexplained deductions from paychecks"). FedEx Home Delivery is a division of FedEx 
Ground Package Sys., Inc. See FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 495 (discussing the 
FedEx business model). 
80. See TEAMSTERS LOCAL 25, http://www.teamsterslocal25.com/about.html (last 
visited Feb. 16, 2011) (providing information about the union) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
81. See FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 495 (summarizing the FedEx Home 
Delivery business model and the union election of the drivers in question). The FedEx 
Home Delivery drivers’ routes were structured around terminals, to which they reported 
each morning from Tuesday to Saturday to load the day’s packages. See FedEx Home 
Delivery, N.L.R.B. Case Nos. 1-RC-22034, 22035, slip op. at 17–18 (First Region, Sept. 
20, 2006) (decision and direction of election), available at http://www.fedexdriverslawsuit. 
com/CaseOverview/administrative.html (follow "FedExNLRB2006Local25Decision1-RC-
22034-22035.doc" hyperlink) (discussing the drivers’ work arrangements). 
82. See FedEx Home Delivery, N.L.R.B. Case Nos. 1-RC22034, 22035, slip op. at 41 
(determining the status of FedEx single-route drivers). 
83. See id. at 43–44 (determining the status of FedEx multiple-route drivers). 
84. See id. (excluding multiple route contractors from the bargaining unit as statutory 
supervisors). 
85. See FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 495 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
(discussing the procedural history of the case). 
86. See FedEx Home Delivery and Local 25, N.L.R.B. Case Nos. 1-RC-22034, 22035, 
Decision and Certifications of Representative, slip op. at 2 (First Region, Feb. 16, 2007) 
available at www.nlrb.gov/shared_files/ALJ%20Decisions/2007/JD-14-07.pdf (noting vote 
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months later, following objections by FedEx, the NLRB finally certified the 
Union as exclusive collective bargaining representative of "[a]ll full-time 
and regular part-time contractors and swing contractors employed" by 
FedEx at both of the voting terminals.87 
FedEx refused to bargain with the Union, and the question of the 
drivers’ employment status returned to the Board in a hearing in which the 
Union sought and received a bargaining order.88  FedEx’s petition for 
review brought the issue before the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia.89 
2. Legal Analysis and Conclusions 
The court began with a brief summary of traditional worker 
classification law under the NLRA, including the factors provided by the 
Restatement (Second) of Agency,90  noting that "Supreme Court precedent 
teaches us not only that the common law of agency is the standard to 
measure employee status but also that we have no authority to change it."91  
The court was also frank about the shortcomings of the law in this area, 
which is "not especially amenable to any sort of bright-line rule."92 
Although the test "[f]or a time" focused on "an employer’s right to exercise 
control" over "the means and manner of the worker’s performance," the 
court lamented that this "did not mean all kinds of controls, but only certain 
kinds."93  The analysis had been adrift: With the control-based test, the 
court mused, "It was as if the sheet music just didn’t quite match the 
tune."94 
Thus the court turned to its own recent decision in Corporate Express 
Delivery Systems v. NLRB,95  which approved a refocusing of emphasis from 
totals). 
87. See id. at 2 (certifying the Union as exclusive bargaining unit representative). 
88. See FedEx Home Delivery, 351 N.L.R.B. No. 16, at 3 (Sept. 28, 2007) (ordering 
FedEx to "bargain with the Union . . . on terms and conditions of employment"). 
89. See FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 495 (describing the procedural facts of the 
case). 
90. See id. at 496 n.1 (providing factors from Restatement (Second) of Agency 
§ 220(2)). 
91. Id. at 496 (emphasis in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
92. See id. (describing the difficulties of applying the common law test). 
93. Id. at 496–97 (emphasis in original). 
94. Id. at 497. 
95. See Corporate Express Delivery Sys. v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 777, 781 (D.C. Cir. 
328 	 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 311 (2011) 
the employer’s control to "whether the putative independent contractors 
have a significant entrepreneurial opportunity for gain or loss."96  This shift 
was explained by the court’s epiphany in Corporate Express that the 
employee status of the full-time cook mentioned in a Restatement 
comment97  must, in fact, arise from the cook’s lack of "entrepreneurial 
opportunity."98  The court portrayed Corporate Express as a "subtle 
refinement"99—the culmination of a long evolution toward better-matching 
sheet music. 
The court turned then to the facts of the case, asking "whether the 
[drivers’] position presents the opportunities and risks inherent in 
entrepreneurialism."100  In Corporate Express, the court had enforced the 
NLRB’s determination of the status of owner-operator truckers who, 
despite the contractual title of "independent contractor," were restricted 
from hiring helpers or using their vehicles for other jobs.101  These truckers 
"lacked all entrepreneurial opportunity," and were therefore employees.102 
By contrast, drivers found to be independent contractors in C.C. Eastern v. 
NLRB,103  another D.C. Circuit case, were paid by the job, rather than by the 
2002) (upholding a Board decision that owner-operator truck drivers were employees rather 
than independent contractors). 
96. Id. at 780 (internal quotation marks omitted); see FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 
563 F.3d 495, 497 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (discussing Corporate Express). Because the NLRB’s 
jurisdiction depends on a finding of employee status and the determination is not thought to 
implicate "special administrative expertise," NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 
260 (1968), reviewing courts owe the Board no special deference, though they must uphold 
"the Board’s choice between two fairly conflicting views, even though the court would 
justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before it de novo." Id. 
97. See Corporate Express, 292 F.3d at 780 (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency 
§ 220(1) cmt. d (1957)). The Court in Corporate Express likened the cook to a corporate 
executive, who "is an employee despite enjoying substantial control over the manner in 
which he does his job," contrasting this with the "lawn-care provider who periodically 
services each of several sites" and is "an independent contractor regardless how closely his 
clients supervise and control his work." Id. 
98. See FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 497 (discussing entrepreneurial 
opportunity). 
99. See id. at 497 ("This subtle refinement was done at the Board’s urging in light of 
[the] comment to the Restatement . . . ."). 
100. Id. 
101. See Corporate Express Delivery Sys. v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 777, 780–81 (D.C. Cir. 
2002) (discussing lack of entrepreneurial opportunity among drivers as a factor in the agency 
test). 
102. See id. (suggesting that the court would have upheld the Board’s finding under the 
"means and manner" control test as well, but upholding the Board’s focus on 
entrepreneurialism rather than decide this question). 
103. See C.C. Eastern, Inc. v. NLRB, 60 F.3d 855, 860–61 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (applying 
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hour or day, and were free to employ helpers and lease out or otherwise use 
their own tractors for other work on weekends or in the evenings.104 
The drivers in FedEx Home Delivery also owned their own vehicles, 
which their contracts permitted them to use for non-FedEx purposes, 
though they were required to "remove or mask all FedEx Home logos and 
markings" emblazoned on the trucks.105  FedEx also permitted drivers to 
incorporate independently, to take on multiple routes, and to "hire their own 
employees."106  Significantly for the court, drivers could also sell or 
otherwise assign their routes without the permission of FedEx.107  On the 
other hand, the company enforced requirements for drivers’ uniforms and 
personal grooming, vehicle size and color, and display of the FedEx logo.108 
FedEx also mandated insurance, specified training or driving experience 
levels, carried out biannual performance audits, provided incentive pay, 
demanded Tuesday-through-Saturday driver availability, and reserved the 
right to reconfigure routes based on a contractor’s performance.109 
FedEx’s numerous constraints on drivers, the court found, were driven 
merely by "customer demands and government regulations," and 
consequently were insufficient to demonstrate an employment 
relationship.110  Ultimately, the factors supporting employee status were 
"clearly outweighed by evidence of entrepreneurial opportunity."111  The 
court therefore found all the Wilmington FedEx drivers to be independent 
contractors,112  albeit over a dissent which attacked the majority’s new focus 
the control test and noting contractually granted entrepreneurial potential in finding truck 
drivers to be independent contractors). 
104. See id. at 859–60 (describing the relationship between the drivers and the 
company). 
105. See FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 498 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
(describing the facts of the case) (internal quotation marks omitted). Contractors, however, 
were "not permitted to use their vehicles for other purposes while providing service for 
FedEx Home." FedEx Home Delivery, N.L.R.B. Case Nos. 1-RC-22034, 22035, slip op. at 
35 (First Region, Sept. 20, 2006) (decision and direction of election) 
available at http://www.fedexdriverslawsuit.com/CaseOverview/administrative.html (follow 
"FedExNLRB2006Local25Decision1-RC-22034-22035.doc" hyperlink). 
106. See FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 499 (providing evidence of entrepreneurial 
potential) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
107. See id. at 500 (noting that this "aspect of the Operating Agreement is significant, 
and is novel under our precedent"). 
108. See id. at 501 (discussing factors indicating control). 
109. See id. at 502 (discussing factors emphasized by the Regional Director). 
110. See id. at 501 (finding insufficient control to indicate an employment relationship). 
111. Id. at 504. 
112. See id. at 495 (declaring the drivers to be independent contractors). 
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as contrary to Supreme Court, Circuit, and Board precedent113  and strongly 
objected to the idea "that one or even a few examples of the exercise of 
contractual rights c[ould] be enough to decide the entrepreneurialism 
factor."114 	Thus, nearly three years after petitioning for union 
representation, the Wilmington drivers were denied the right under the 
National Labor Relations Act to organize and demand to bargain 
collectively with the entity a majority of them considered their employer.115 
B. NLRB v. Friendly Cab Co.: Entrepreneurialism as a Subset of the 
Control Test 
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit is not alone in recognizing the relevance of entrepreneurialism in 
circumstances where courts struggle to define the boundaries of employee 
status under common-law standards.116  In NLRB v. Friendly Cab Co.,117  the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently upheld an NLRB 
determination that San Francisco Bay Area taxi drivers were employees and 
that their employer, Friendly Cab Company, Inc., was statutorily obligated 
to bargain with the union they had formed.118  In this case, entrepreneurial 
activity was not only lacking among the drivers—it was contractually 
113. See id. at 508 (Garland, J., dissenting in part) ("Corporate Express did not purport 
to overrule Supreme Court, Circuit, and Board precedent."). 
114. Id. at 517. Instead, Judge Garland argued that "[i]t [wa]s not unreasonable for the 
NLRB to take the position that a material number of workers must actually take advantage 
of an opportunity before it will conclude that the opportunity is significant and realistic 
rather than insubstantial and theoretical." Id. 
115. See id. at 495 (majority opinion) (vacating the NLRB’s finding that FedEx had 
committed an unfair labor practice by refusing to negotiate with the drivers’ union 
representative). 
116. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (noting the difficulties courts have had 
applying the distinction in trucker and taxi driver settings). In fact, entrepreneurialism has 
long been considered among the common-law factors. See, e.g., Walter V. Siebert & N. 
Dawn Webber, Joint Employer, Single Employer, and Alter Ego, 3 LAB. LAW. 873, 885 
(1987) ("The test for independent contractor status of owner/operators in the trucking 
industry is the ‘right to control’ test with particular emphasis on the assumption of 
entrepreneurial risks."). 
117. See NLRB v. Friendly Cab Co., 512 F.3d 1090, 1097 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding taxi 
drivers to be employees of Friendly Cab Company, which "exercises significant control over 
the means and manner of its drivers’ performance," and "plac[ing] particular significance on 
Friendly’s requirement that its drivers may not engage in any entrepreneurial opportunities"). 
118. See id. at 1103 ("[W]e conclude there is substantial evidence in the record to 
support the NLRB’s determination that Friendly’s taxicab drivers are ‘employees’ within the 
meaning of the Act."). 
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forbidden by the employer, who thereby demonstrated pervasive control 
over the means and manner of the drivers’ job performance.119  Although 
the Ninth Circuit characterized "entrepreneurial aspects of the individual’s 
business" as an important factor additional to the "essential ingredient" 
control,120  the Board had phrased the issue differently, finding that "‘[t]he 
most significant evidence of Employer control in this case is that the drivers 
are not permitted to operate independent businesses.’"121  The NLRB’s 
approach in Friendly Cab Co. demonstrates a view of entrepreneurialism as 
primarily an indicator of control or the lack thereof, as opposed to an 
independent focus of the agency test.122  Notably, this is the precise 
interpretation followed by the D.C. Court twenty years earlier,123  implicitly 
overruled in FedEx Home Delivery.124 
IV. FedEx Home Delivery Illustrates the Need for the Legislature to 
Squarely Address Worker Classification Under the NLRA 
Although the court in FedEx Home Delivery found the company’s 
business model "somewhat unique,"125  its labor relations policy is 
essentially a better designed and more successful iteration of the strategy 
described in the 1914 case Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage.126  In 
119. See id. at 1098 (noting Friendly’s prohibitions on using taxicabs for outside 
business, soliciting customers independently, carrying individual business cards in addition 
to the required company cards, and subleasing taxis). 
120. Id. at 1096–97 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
121. Id. at 1098 (quoting Friendly Cab Co., Inc., 341 N.L.R.B. 722, 724 (Apr. 30, 
2004)). 
122. Cf. Clara Seymour, NLRB v. Friendly Cab Company: Entrepreneurialism and the 
Independent Contractor/Employee Distinction, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 503, 505 
(2008) ("[E]ntrepreneurial freedom may be construed as its own factor indicating control or 
lack thereof, or may be inherent in the ‘distinct occupation or business’ factor in the 
Restatement (Second) of Agency."). 
123. See N. Am. Van Lines, Inc. v. NLRB, 869 F.2d 596, 600 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (finding 
that other common law "factors are of far less importance than the central inquiry whether 
the corporation exercises control over the manner and means of the details of the worker’s 
performance; indeed, these factors are probative only to the extent that they bear upon and 
further that inquiry" (emphasis added)). 
124. See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing the court’s findings in FedEx Home Delivery). 
125. FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 501 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
126. See Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 F. 547, 552–53 (2d Cir. 1914) 
(finding that a miner working for another miner was an employee, not an independent 
contractor, of the coal company); see also Carlson, supra note 6, at 311 (discussing Lehigh 
Valley as "[a] good example of the courts’ tendency to define ‘employee’ expansively for 
purposes of protective legislation"). 
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Lehigh Valley, a coal company sought to avoid liability for miners’ injuries 
by using the independent contractor model.127  The company structured its 
business so that those who worked in its mines were all either independent 
contractors or employees of those contractors.128  The company was, it 
argued, "not in the business of coal mining at all . . . but . . . only engaged 
in letting out contracts to independent contractors, to whom they owe as 
little duty as to those firms which set up the pumps in their mines."129  This 
outcome was, of course, intolerable for injured miners who would "have 
recourse as an employer only to one of their own, without financial 
responsibility or control of any capital."130  Judge Learned Hand looked 
both to the purposes of the applicable worker’s compensation statute and to 
the common-sense realities of the arrangement to find that Yensavage, a 
laborer injured in Lehigh Valley’s mine, was an employee.131 
Like the Lehigh Valley Coal Company with its mines, FedEx claims 
merely to contract out routes: According to a recent press release, FedEx 
Ground works "in collaboration with thousands of dedicated small business 
owners to deliver exceptional service to the marketplace."132  Nonetheless, 
the image of package deliverers as small-business owners may seem odd to 
anyone who has received packages from uniformed UPS and FedEx drivers 
and assumed both to be actually employed by their respective companies.133 
Odder still is the fact that the quarrel between the drivers and the 
company, along with the debate among the FedEx Home Delivery judges, 
goes on without anyone ever pausing to ask why control or entrepreneurial 
potential should be important. Given that a vote among the workers at the 
127. See Lehigh Valley, 218 F. at 552 ("[T]he necessary conclusion of the defendant’s 
theory is that Terowsky, as well as the plaintiff, was not an employe [sic] of the company, 
and that they owed him none of the duties of a master to a servant."). 
128. See id. (describing the coal company’s business model). 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
131. See id. at 552–53 ("He is himself as dependent upon the conditions of his 
employment as the company fixes them as are his helpers. By him alone is carried on the 
company’s only business; he is their ‘hand,’ if any one is."). 
132. FedEx Ground Names Entrepreneurs of the Year, BUS. WIRE (Oct. 22, 2009), 
http://www.businesswire.com/portal/site/home/permalink/?ndmViewId=news_view&newsId 
=20091022006273 (last visited Feb. 16, 2011) (describing FedEx "Entrepreneurs of the 
Year") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
133. See Thomas Brom, Who’s an Employee?, CAL. LAW. (Nov. 2009), http://www. 
callawyer.com/story.cfm?eid=905178&evid=1  (last visited Feb. 16, 2011) (noting that, 
although UPS and FedEx drivers appear to perform the same job, UPS drivers are generally 
employees while FedEx drivers are independent contractors) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
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Wilmington terminals demonstrated the majority’s desire to bargain 
collectively with the company for which they labored, what relevance can 
attach to the fine points of their work arrangement—particularly in a close 
case in which "some factors cut one way and some the other"?134  The clear 
response is simply that where "marginal groups . . . , though entrepreneurial 
in form, lack[] the bargaining power necessary to obtain decent 
compensation, decent hours, and decent working conditions,"135  their 
fundamental rights should not depend on principles developed to allocate 
tort liability.136  In other words, common law principles should not matter 
"[a]s long as employers control the working conditions that workers want 
improved."137  If the Board were permitted to adopt the approach to 
statutory interpretation that undergirded Lehigh, then the FedEx Home 
Delivery court might have arrived at a more reasonable conclusion: That 
the principles upon which labor law is based actually support allowing the 
drivers who organized in Wilmington to bargain collectively with the entity 
upon which their livelihoods depend. 
A. Any Substantive, Non-Legislative Reform Will Be Arbitrary 
and Incomplete 
As long as both Congress and the Supreme Court refuse to reconsider 
the illogical underpinnings of the law as it stands, the ability of the lower 
courts and the Board to construct a manageable, reasonable legal 
framework is limited.138  Nonetheless, commentators have proposed a 
134. FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 497 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
135. See L.A. Meat and Provision Drivers Union, Local 626 v. United States, 371 U.S. 
94, 109 (1962) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (calling for court to emphasize "economic facts of 
the relation" in determining employment status of grease peddlers under the NLRA (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
136. See Simulated Statutory Purposelessness, supra note 44, at 187–88 ("[Courts] 
interpret the definition of the class of workers protected by modern labor legislation without 
mentioning the statutory purposes, but solely by reference to eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century judicial doctrine determining the scope of liability of coach owners for the injuries 
inflicted by horse owners’ drivers on third parties . . . ."). 
137. See id. at 201 (noting that courts applying the agency test to determine worker 
status are unable to confront the policy issues underlying the cases). 
138. Cf. Alan Hyde, Response to Working Group on Chapter 1 of the Proposed 
Restatement of Employment Law: On Purposeless Restatement, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP’T 
POL’Y J. 87, 87–88 (2009) (contending that any Restatement which "seeks to define relations 
of employment without any reference to any purpose of employment law" will be inherently 
arbitrary and unable to rationally restate the law). 
334 	 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 311 (2011) 
variety of substantive reformulations of the common-law tests.139  These 
attempts are constrained by current doctrine, which leads scholars 
ostensibly to lay aside the policies and purposes behind collective 
bargaining legislation and instead simply emphasize those factors which, 
according to each test’s formulator, characterize the "real" independent 
contractor.140  In other words, the fact that the Court has rejected policy-
based interpretation141  prevents those who call for change short of 
legislative amendment from openly acknowledging that by "genuine 
employee" they mean—rightfully—the employee that would fulfill the aims 
of labor legislation.142 
FedEx Home Delivery is notable for how fully it embraces this 
arbitrariness: 	Unlike a recent failed attempt to change the test’s 
emphasis,143  the FedEx Home Delivery majority explicitly refocuses its 
analysis while successfully pretending that its judgment has absolutely no 
social context. As a result, its conclusion—that entrepreneurial potential as 
the essence of independent contractor status—is just as arbitrary as the 
control analysis was.144  "Independence" could, after all, be found to 
139. See, e.g., Jonathan P. Hiatt, Policy Issues Concerning the Contingent Work Force, 
52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 739, 750 (1995) (proposing "a definition that more appropriately 
recognizes the voluntary and entrepreneurial nature of a true independent contractor"). 
140. But see id. at 751 (calling also for a presumption that workers in "low-wage, low-
skilled sectors of the economy . . . are ‘employees’" and place on the employer "a heavy 
burden to prove otherwise"). 
141. See Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 325 (1992) (stating that 
the Court has abandoned the "emphasis on construing that term [‘employee’] in the light of 
the mischief to be corrected and the end to be attained" (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
142. See Burdick, supra note 37, at 135 (calling for the Board to inquire into "factors 
demonstrating entrepreneurial independence and the relative dependence of employees" 
under the common-law agency test). Although Ms. Burdick effectively demonstrates that 
Congress in 1935 intended a broad understanding of "employee," geared toward protecting 
workers who suffer from low bargaining power, see id. at 90–93 (discussing the original 
intent of the Wagner Act’s drafters), the Court’s recent decisions ultimately force her, like 
the FedEx Home Delivery court (and like this Note in Part V, infra), to phrase her conclusion 
in the less relevant terms of the common law. See FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 
F.3d 492, 504 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (stating that the court considered all the common law factors 
in reaching its decision). Ms. Burdick shows that this test is flexible and can accommodate 
new factors, yet Darden makes it difficult, if not impermissible, to talk about why it should 
do so. 
143. See infra note 161 and accompanying text (discussing the dissenting opinion by 
Board Member Liebman in St. Joseph News-Press and Teamsters Union Local 460, 345 
N.L.R.B. 474 (2005)). 
144. See FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 497 (finding that "whether the putative 
independent contractors have significant entrepreneurial opportunity for gain or loss" is a 
"more accurate proxy" than the "unwieldy control inquiry" (internal quotation marks 
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revolve around other factors within the common-law test, including, for 
example, the worker’s degree of integration into the purported employer’s 
business operations.145  Indeed, this element figured prominently in United 
Insurance, in which the Supreme Court listed, as the first of many "decisive 
factors," the fact that "the agents d[id] not operate their own independent 
businesses, but perform[ed] functions that [we]re an essential part of the 
company’s normal operations."146  Thus, the Corporate Express court 
simply erred when it stated that "[t]he full-time cook and the executive are 
employees and the lawn-care provider is an independent contractor not 
because of the degree of supervision under which each labors but because 
of the degree to which each functions as an entrepreneur."147  As a matter of 
common sense, as well as common law, neither factor in and of itself ought 
to make one an employee or independent contractor. As long as the Board 
and the courts claim to be able to distill the fundamental nature of worker 
classifications into one—or even several—common law factors, the 
resulting arbitrary tests will continue to provide protections and rights 
which do not match the needs of modern workers. 
B. There Are Viable Statutory Alternatives to the Common Law Test 
In contrast to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit, many scholars acknowledge that the definitions of 
"independent contractor" and "employee" are inherently policy decisions. 
Some of the policies at issue are found in the preamble to the National 
omitted)). Without considering why the Board and courts make this inquiry at all, however, 
it is difficult to discern precisely for what it is a superior proxy. 
145. See id. at 506 n.3 (Garland, J., dissenting in part) (listing Restatement factors, 
including "whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the employer"). This 
factor has come to dominate many Canadian labor boards’ common-law analysis. See 
Michael Bendel, The Dependent Contractor: An Unnecessary and Flawed Development in 
Canadian Labour Law, 32 U. TORONTO L.J. 374, 382–83 (1982) (arguing that common-law 
evolution of the "organization test" rendered development of dependent contractor status 
superfluous). One Ontario Labour Relations Board decision Mr. Bendel quotes found "[t]he 
essence of operating a business" to be inherently inconsistent with "circumstances where 
growth is totally integrated with the operations of a particular customer." Id. at 382. When 
"the driver’s means of financial support is inextricably bound up with" one client, the driver 
cannot be considered independent. Id. 
146. See NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 258–59 (1968) (listing the 
factors which, under "pertinent common-law agency principles," led to a finding of 
employee status for insurance agents). 
147. Corporate Express Delivery Sys. v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 777, 780 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
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Labor Relations Act,148  which prominently sets out "inequality of 
bargaining power" as one of the problems to be remedied by the 
legislation.149  More generally, "workplace democracy, redistribution, and 
efficiency" have been suggested as the most convincing rationales for laws 
protecting workers’ collective bargaining rights.150  Commentators have 
proposed a number of solutions to the classification issue which would 
better address these concerns than the current binary employee/independent 
contractor division. These solutions include the creation of a "dependent 
contractor" or "employee-like person" category of worker151  or a return to 
the "economic reality" of dependence analysis which Taft-Hartley 
purported to reject.152  Other approaches would more fully reject employee 
status as a valid prerequisite for organizing and collective bargaining 
rights.153  Although all of these proposals would expand the scope of 
American labor law protections, they have the potential to benefit both 
workers and businesses, which have a mutual interest in clearer, less 
manipulable, and more easily administrated standards.154 
148. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2004) (expounding the purposes of the National Labor 
Relations Act). 
149. See id. (noting "inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not 
possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract[] and employers" and law’s 
goal of "restoring equality of bargaining power between employers and employees"). 
150. See Guy Davidov, Collective Bargaining Laws: Purpose and Scope, 20 INT’L J. 
COMP. LAB. L. & INDUS. REL. 81, 83 (2004) [hereinafter Collective Bargaining] (discussing 
the grounds on which collective bargaining laws are generally based internationally). While 
it was not explicitly mentioned in the statute’s preamble, Professor Davidov states that 
democratic self-government in the workplace was an explicit goal of Senator Wagner, 
sponsor of the NLRA. See id. at 86 n.15 (denying that workplace democracy was merely an 
"unstated goal" of the Act). 
151. See Universal Worker Coverage, supra note 35, at 557 (calling for these categories 
of coverage "to prevent employers (and courts) from denying heteronomous workers the 
right to self-organization by virtue of unilaterally imposed cosmetic contractual changes of 
working conditions") (internal quotation marks omitted). 
152. See Burdick, supra note 37, at 125 (asserting that the Board can consider these 
factors). 
153. See infra Part IV.A.3 (discussing these proposals). 
154. See Saveland, supra note 23, at 117 ("There has to be legislation—primarily in the 
federal sphere—that will provide guidance to companies, workers, courts, and administrative 
agencies that are making these important determinations every day."). 
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1. A Definitional Compromise: The Dependent Contractor 
Perhaps the clearest and simplest solution is the creation of a 
"dependent contractor" category.155  Such a classification would be a legal 
recognition of the reality that shades of gray exist between the completely 
integrated and dependent employee and the fully independent, small-
business-operating contractor.156  This proposal also has the particular 
practical advantage of possible implementation at the state level.157  Just as 
California’s Agricultural Labor Relations Board governs the collective 
bargaining rights that the state extends to farm workers (who are also 
excluded from the NLRA’s coverage) state legislatures could extend 
organizational rights to specific categories of non-employees.158  Because 
the dependent contractor is a well-established labor-law classification in 
several foreign countries, a variety of models, extending varying levels of 
protection and rights to workers within the classification, could serve as a 
framework for legislators.159  This proposal has great potential for 
incrementally strengthening the rights of many employee-like workers 
without entirely rejecting the common law employee/independent 
contractor distinction. 
155. See THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP, supra note 10, at 240 (proposing "creating a 
category of statutory or constructive employees—that of ‘dependent contractors,’ 
‘uncontrolled employees,’ or ‘employee-like persons’"). See generally Beyond Employees, 
supra note 57 (describing the dependent contractor in Canadian labor law). 
156. See, e.g., THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP, supra note 10, at 8–9 (presenting a 
typology of five work relationships on a scale according to dependence); see also id. at 235 
(arguing that in the post-World War II period, "accumulation of capital intensified the 
subordinarion of . . . marginal (non-employing) quasi-contractors to the entities for which 
they worked, even where they were not necessarily subject to the latter’s daily physical 
commands"). 
157. See Elizabeth Kennedy, Comment, Freedom from Independence: Collective 
Bargaining Rights for "Dependent Contractors", 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 143, 155 
(2005) (noting that already, "several states have created antitrust exemptions that allow 
independent contractor physicians to form labor unions and negotiate contracts"). 
158. See id. at 148 (proposing states create "dependent contractor relations board[s]"). 
159. See St. Joseph News-Press and Teamsters Union Local 460, 345 N.L.R.B. 474, 
486 (2005) (Member Liebman, dissenting) (noting the existence of such arrangements in 
Sweden, Canada, and Germany). 
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2. A Return to Economic Realities and Dependence 
Another approach would resurrect the practical, economic-
dependence-based analysis of cases like Hearst Publications.160  Although 
one member of the NLRB recently asserted that the agency test, under 
current law, "can accommodate economic reality [and] . . . . the factor of 
economic dependence,"161  the majority’s present position is that "it is for 
Congress, not the Board, to address such concerns."162  Thus any changes in 
this direction would likely have to be legislated.163 
While somewhat attractive as a way to stop employers from merely 
contorting the work relationship to conform to legal tests,164  the economic 
reality test—which is still applied in the context of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act—has faced harsh criticism.165  The focus on dependence has been 
critiqued as amorphous, while also incapable of serving workers who are 
dependent, not on a specific, single employer, but on employers as a 
class.166  A migrant farm laborer, for example, is not fully dependent on any 
one employer, yet he or she is plainly no entrepreneurial small business 
owner.167  At the same time, highly-skilled or educated contractors may 
160. See, e.g., Charles B. Craver, The National Labor Relations Act Must Be Revised to 
Preserve Industrial Democracy, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 397, 417 (1992) (arguing for the NLRA to 
be revised to define "employee" expansively according to "economic realities"). 
161. See St. Joseph News-Press and Teamsters Union Local 460, 345 N.L.R.B. at 484 
(Member Liebman, dissenting) (arguing that economic dependence, along with other factors, 
indicated that newspaper deliverers were employees). 
162. See id. at 481 (rejecting the argument that "differences in bargaining power" can 
play any role in the common law test). 
163. But see Burdick, supra note 37, at 125 (contending that "the Board may expand its 
inquiry to include facts that tend to prove the independence associated with entrepreneurs 
and the dependence coincident with employee status"). 
164. See infra note 215 and accompanying text (discussing recent restructuring of labor 
relations in California by FedEx Ground to maintain the independent contractor business 
model after a court ruling unfavorable to the company). 
165. See, e.g., Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1539–45 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(Easterbrook, J., concurring) (criticizing the "unfocused" economic realities test under the 
FLSA and calling, instead, for categorical coverage of workers with "no physical capital and 
little human capital to vend"). 
166. See THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP, supra note 10, at 237 ("[B]y seeking to 
avoid association with a dogmatic approach, the modern economic reality test has made 
itself vulnerable to the charge that it does not encompass reasonable limits." (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). Of course, this critique also pertains to the dependent contractor 
proposal. 
167. See Michael C. Harper, Defining the Economic Relationship Appropriate for 
Collective Bargaining, 39 B.C. L. REV. 329, 340 (1998) (arguing that economic dependency 
analysis "begs the difficult question of what is economic independence and suggests 
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have numerous job options and significant financial independence,168  even 
while they "are dependent on their customers for their daily wage."169 
3. Universal Coverage 
Those who are concerned about the inadequacy of the dependent 
contractor or economic reality approaches propose that legal collective 
bargaining protections should extend universally to all those for whom 
organized action is appropriate.170  Professor Katherine Stone, for example, 
has called for reforms which would "permit or even promote a form of 
organization that includes atypical together with regular [workers], 
employed together with unemployed, part time as well as full time, and 
independent contractors as well as employees."171  Similarly, Professor 
Marc Linder calls for "expanding the employment relationship into one 
between a service provider and recipient."172  A less dramatic, but perhaps 
more achievable reform, proposed by Professor Michael Harper, would 
extend NLRA "coverage [to] all workers who sell their labor, as enhanced 
by any special training or talent, to be combined primarily with capital 
provided by others."173  Under this test, package deliverers and taxi drivers, 
whether or not they own their vehicles, are encompassed by the NLRA 
because "most of the capital made productive by the[ir] . . . labor has been 
supplied by others."174  By contrast, "distributors that have accumulated a 
categorizations that seem unsatisfactory"). 
168. See Stone, supra note 5, at 279–80 (describing independent contractors as "a bi-
modal group" including some "highly skilled professionals or craftspeople" as well as "low 
skilled individuals who work as essentially day laborers"). 
169. See THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP, supra note 10, at 238 (stating that 
"economic dependence" as a test "is also incapable of distinguishing the run-of-the-mill 
independent contractor from the employee"). 
170. See generally Collective Bargaining, supra note 150 (discussing economic 
relationships appropriate for collective bargaining). 
171. Stone, supra note 5, at 283. 
172. See Simulated Statutory Purposelessness, supra note 44, at 223 (arguing for the 
expansion of the employment relationship for purposes of the NLRA). 
173. Harper, supra note 167, at 341. 
174. See id. at 340–42 ("[T]he coverage of this Act should be determined by its central 
substantive purpose—offering those who combine their labor with traditional, nonhuman 
capital provided by others to bargain collectively with such providers for a division of the 
returns from the combination."). 
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fleet of vehicles or independent ‘goodwill’ with customers" would not be 
eligible for collective bargaining.175 
Expansive legislative reform of collective bargaining rights will, of 
course, require some consideration of antitrust concerns.176  State and 
federal antitrust statutes currently render unlawful certain anticompetitive 
contracts, combinations, and conspiracies.177  While human labor is not 
considered to be a commodity subject to these laws, courts have found 
collective negotiation and concerted action by independent contractors to 
constitute illegal price fixing and an unlawful restraint on trade.178  This 
Note will not address at length the question of how precisely Congress 
should balance potential antitrust issues associated with the organization of 
individual market participants against the need to permit individuals who 
suffer from severe inequality of bargaining power in the marketplace to 
band together.179  Professor Linder frames the basic issue well enough for 
present purposes: 
In an age of colossal worldwide mergers resulting in unprecedented 
capital centralization, the fear that 202 truck owner-drivers in Asheville, 
North Carolina, who distributed and delivered the local newspaper . . . 
were really an entrepreneurial association masquerading as a labor union 
in an effort to evade the antitrust laws, should not be permitted to 
conceal the fact that they are "drivers who get paid whatever the 
Newspaper agrees to pay, for doing whatever the Newspaper tells them 
to do."180 
Ultimately, there are numerous avenues available for legislators to 
grant long-overdue organizational rights to historically excluded workers— 
as well as much-needed clarification for employers.181  However the lines 
175. See id. at 344 (arguing that such individuals do not need labor law protections). 
176. See Simulated Statutory Purposelessness, supra note 44, at 227 ("Resolution of 
coverage disputes under the NLRA calls for rethinking the need for unstinting vigilance in 
applying the rigors of the antitrust laws against marginal groups on the border between labor 
and capital, whose lack of bargaining power has prompted other societies to grant them 
collective bargaining rights."). 
177. See Kennedy, supra note 157, at 169–70 (summarizing federal antitrust law’s 
application to independent contractors). 
178. See id. at 168–74 (discussing antitrust cases involving independent contractors and 
unions). 
179. See id. at 168–69 (discussing "the inherent tension between antitrust policy, which 
is designed to maximize individual competition, and national labor policy, which is designed 
to promote cooperation between workers in the face of employer economic power"). 
180. See Simulated Statutory Purposelessness, supra note 44, at 227 (quoting Fort 
Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 263 N.L.R.B. 854, 856 (1982) (Member Jenkins, dissenting)). 
181. See Saveland, supra note 23, at 117 (criticizing the ambiguity and flexibility of 
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are to be redrawn, the above proposals all have at their base the simple 
assertion that the decision should be made based on economic and social 
policy—not the common law.182 
V. In the Absence of Legislative Action, the Board and the Courts Must 
Continue to Refine the Common-Law Test with a Focus on the 
Individual Worker 
Although scholars have disputed how much flexibility the Supreme 
Court-mandated agency test allows,183  many commentators have agreed 
with the position implicitly adopted by the FedEx Home Delivery court— 
that the test is open to ongoing evolution.184  Such an evolutionary approach 
appears necessary, given the rapidly changing modern economy,185  and the 
lower courts and the Board must struggle, as best they can within the 
current doctrinal framework,186  to draw lines of statutory coverage as 
logically as the law permits. 
current tests and calling for more concrete guidance providing "the financial and workforce 
stability that is necessary for any successful business"). 
182. See Simulated Statutory Purposelessness, supra note 44, at 199 ("For example, 
when the Board must determine whether physicians working for HMOs are employees 
entitled to bargain collectively with their employers, the monumental judgment virtually 
cries out for a policy decision."); Kennedy, supra note 157, at 155–57 (discussing statutory 
antitrust exemptions created in Texas, Washington, Alaska, and New Jersey to allow 
independent physicians to form unions and negotiate with HMOs). 
183. See Universal Worker Coverage, supra note 35, at 575 n.78 (noting the argument 
that "‘[u]nder the rather explicit congressional mandate, a strict interpretation of the right of 
control should be both the beginning and the end of analysis.’" (quoting Harvey M. 
Adelstein & Harry T. Edwards, The Resurrection of NLRB v. Hearst: Independent 
Contractors Under the National Labor Relations Act, 17 U. KAN. L. REV. 191, 194 (1969))). 
184. See supra, Part IV.A (discussing proposals for adjusting the common law test); see 
also FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 497 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (describing the 
process of refining the agency test in recent cases of the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia). But see id. at 504 (Garland, J., dissenting in part) ("While the NLRB may have 
authority to alter the focus of the common-law test, see Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. 
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43, 863–64 (1984), this court does not."). 
185. See St. Joseph News-Press and Teamsters Union Local 460, 345 N.L.R.B. 474, 
487 (2005) (Member Liebman, dissenting) (criticizing the Board majority’s "rigid, outdated 
version of the common law agency test . . . which ignores relevant economic factors and 
contradicts the true spirit of the common law: [F]lexibility and growth to match a society in 
constant development"); Burdick, supra note 37, at 127 (calling for evolution in the face of 
"changes in the conditions of society and developments in the American workplace"). 
186. See supra note 60 (discussing NLRB v. United Insurance Co. of America, 390 U.S. 
254, 256 (1968) and Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 325 
(1992)). 
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At the most basic level, worker classification under Section 2(3) of the 
NLRA comes down to the congressional determination that labor law ought 
not to be used to protect those individuals who are independent 
contractors.187  At the same time, the legislative history of the Act, as well 
as specific statutory provisions, make exceedingly clear that the law is to 
guard scrupulously the right of free labor association enjoyed by actual 
employees.188  It is thus apparent that, even while the substantive law 
surrounding classification remains grounded in imperfect common law 
tests, the Board and courts have a duty to apply it with a procedural 
precision that will extend no unintended advantages to independent 
contractors, and yet will leave no employee unprotected. A harmonization 
of the FedEx Home Delivery majority’s emphasis on entrepreneurialism 
and the dissent’s resistance to privileging potential over actual relationships 
may contribute to such a solution. 
Although Taft-Harley, as interpreted in NLRB v. United Insurance Co. 
of America, seems to have foreclosed Judge Hand’s "economic realities" 
and "statutory purpose" analysis in the NLRA context,189  the 
entrepreneurialism focus, properly applied to labor relations, actually 
addresses many of the same concerns. In spite of the fact that the FedEx 
Home Delivery approach resulted in a ruling unfavorable to the union, the 
control test which an "entrepreneurial potential" emphasis would supplant is 
not inherently any more favorable to borderline workers, like the FedEx 
drivers, who seek to unionize. Indeed, the Service Employees International 
Union (SEIU) has called for a definition "that more appropriately 
recognizes the voluntary and entrepreneurial nature of a true independent 
contractor," which resembles in some ways the FedEx Home Delivery 
framework.190  At the same time, pro-business interests which support the 
187. See Harper, supra note 167, at 342 (explaining that independent contractors with 
significant capital investments have stronger bargaining power, do not fall within the labor 
exception to antitrust law, and would not share a community of interest with laborers). 
188. See Burdick, supra note 37, at 90–91 (discussing the legislative history 
surrounding the Wagner Act); 29 U.S.C. § 151 (declaring the national policy of 
"encouraging . . . collective bargaining and . . . protecting the exercise by workers of full 
freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own 
choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or 
other mutual aid or protection"). 
189. See Carlson, supra note 6, at 311 (describing Lehigh Valley as "quite possibly the 
earliest clear statement of the ‘economic realities’ and ‘statutory purpose’ theories"). 
190. See Hiatt, supra note 139, at 750 (arguing for a definition "that would recognize 
the distinction between an employee and an independent contractor in a more direct, less 
manipulable manner"). Mr. Hiatt proposed the following factors as indicative of 
independent contractor status: (1) that the worker bear risk of economic loss, (2) that the 
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use of independent contractors have vigorously defended the traditional 
right-to-control test191  and condemned the unpredictability inherent in 
establishing a new entrepreneurial-opportunity-based test.192  Although it 
undeniably introduces a new element of unpredictability to the field, the 
entrepreneurialism-focused approach may begin to draw a more logical line 
between the independent businessperson and the dependent employee. As 
applied by the FedEx Home Delivery court, however, the test improperly 
conflates potential with reality. 
A. Entrepreneurialism Is a Potentially Useful Focus 
The entrepreneurialism analysis promulgated by FedEx Home 
Delivery has the potential to serve as a better focus than "control" because it 
can be applied procedurally on a worker-by-worker basis to mitigate the 
arbitrariness of the common-law line-drawing. The FedEx Home Delivery 
court applied the risk of loss/chance of gain factor with an emphasis on 
rights and potential.193  All of the drivers, the court pointed out, signed the 
same contract.194  Moreover, the majority emphasized, the contractually-
granted opportunities were not necessarily unattainable for the majority of 
drivers who had not taken advantage of them.195  Considering all drivers 
work not be integral to the client’s business, (3) that the worker control his or her own work 
schedule and manner of payment, and, finally (4) that the worker "hold[] himself or herself 
out to the public as available to render services by means of an established business 
presence." Id. In addition, however, Mr. Hiatt’s test would presume that workers with low 
bargaining power are employees. See id. at 751 (proposing a heavy presumption in favor of 
employee status for low-wage, low-skill workers). 
191. See Brief for Washington Legal Foundation, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondent/Cross-Petitioner at 5, FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492 (D.C. Cir. 
2009) (Nos. 07-1391, 07-1436), 2008 WL 4425830, at *5 ("Amici strongly support use of 
the independent contractor model . . . . By recognizing that individuals often provide 
services for others while maintaining independent control over the means and methods of 
their services, the law fosters an entrepreneurial spirit among those individuals . . . ."). 
192. See id. at 6 ("[A]n ‘entrepreneurial opportunity’ test is inherently vague, and 
relying on that test to a significant degree will merely lead to increased confusion."). 
193. See FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 498 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (stating 
that potential, not actual activities are relevant). 
194. See id. at 499 n.6 (criticizing the dissent for seeming to assume that the activities 
of drivers found to be statutory supervisors, and thus excluded from a prospective bargaining 
unit, should be irrelevant to the analysis). 
195. See id. at 502 (stating that "even one instance of a driver using such an opportunity 
can be sufficient to show there is no unwritten rule of invisible barrier preventing other 
drivers from likewise exercising their contractual right" (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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equally capable of seizing the possibilities contained in their Standard 
Contractor Operating Agreements, the court stated that "both the Board and 
this court have found [that] the failure to take advantage of an opportunity 
is beside the point."196 
This reliance on entrepreneurial rights, which for most drivers remain 
potential activities rather than actual business practice, is unjustified. In the 
FedEx Home Delivery context, the only meaningful path to 
entrepreneurialism available to a deliverer entails abandoning the role of 
single-route driver and becoming a manager of other workers,197  like the 
"independent contractors" in Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage.198 
Thus, a limited proportion of drivers are able, in essence, to promote 
themselves to supervisory positions with FedEx, while the majority fulfill 
non-supervisory and non-entrepreneurial functions.199  For this majority, 
such contractual rights affect the individual driver’s actual day-to-day job 
very little, yet threaten important statutory rights.200  By extending the 
196. See id. at 503 (finding it more than sufficient that "routes have been sold for a 
profit; substitutes and helpers have been hired without FedEx’s involvement; one contractor 
has negotiated for higher rates; and contractors have incorporated"). But see id. at 516 
(Garland, J., dissenting in part) ("Nor is there anything . . . to suggest that the Board believes 
that the exercise of contractual opportunity by one or even a small number of drivers can be 
sufficient."). 
197. But see, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Teamsters Hope to Lure FedEx Drivers, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 30, 2006, at A12 (stating that "a FedEx Ground driver who opposes 
unionization[] said he felt like an independent businessman as he sought to expand his 
volume by encouraging businesses along his route to use FedEx Ground instead of UPS"). 
Drivers also possessed some discretion in hiring the driver’s choice of helper or temporary 
replacement. See FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 513 n.14 (Garland, J., dissenting in 
part) (noting that "a driver cannot take a vacation, or even a day off, when he wants to, 
without providing a replacement"). Nonetheless, given FedEx’s far-reaching control over 
the drivers’ business options, this Note generally takes the position that the other activities 
described by FedEx as entrepreneurial should not seriously affect the courts’ analysis. See 
infra, Part V.B (discussing factors demonstrating meaningful entrepreneurial independence). 
198. See Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 F. 547, 552 (2d Cir. 1914) (noting 
that under the company’s theory, workers would "have recourse as an employer only to one 
of their own"). 
199. Compare FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 499 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
(stating that "more than twenty-five percent of contractors have hired their own employees at 
some point"), with id. at 515 (Garland, J., dissenting in part) ("Nor was there any evidence 
that any operator at the terminals at issue in this case ever hired a substitute on a full-time 
basis."). Because the efficient operation of the business depends on both supervisors and 
subordinates to get packages delivered, there will, presumably, always be a certain number 
of drivers who "cannot realistically take" the opportunity to manage others. Id. at 502 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
200. See Brief for Washington Legal Foundation et al., supra note 191, at 21 (arguing 
that "the entrepreneurial opportunities presented by a working relationship ought to be 
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doctrinal shift that forms the basis of FedEx Home Delivery in a procedural 
manner to focus on each individual worker’s actual exercise of 
entrepreneurial potential,201  the courts can recognize that the majority of the 
delivery drivers within a company like FedEx simply fulfill a different 
function than managerial contractors like Jason Keefe,202  and therefore 
deserve different legal treatment. 
This approach’s de-emphasis of the importance of contractual terms is 
not without precedent in American labor law.203  In the classification 
context specifically, courts have long been willing to disregard contractual 
labels which may obscure the substance of a work arrangement or violate 
the policies underlying the NLRA.204  Moreover, while the intent of the 
determined by the relationship that actually exists, not by what additional relationships the 
worker can create"). The Washington Legal Foundation noted that: 
Presumably, FedEx would be open to overtures from single-route drivers to 
perform a wide variety of contracting services for the company—maintaining 
company lawns, laundering uniforms, or cleaning offices at the end of the day, 
for example. The potential availability of such entrepreneurial opportunities is 
neither more nor less relevant than the potential availability of a second driving 
route for which an individual would be required to hire a more-or-less full-time 
driver. 
Id. 
201. Seeds for such doctrinal growth can also be found, for example, in Corporate 
Express Delivery Systems, in which the court conceived of entrepreneurialism as "the degree 
to which [a worker] functions as an entrepreneur—that is, takes economic risk and has the 
corresponding opportunity to profit from working smarter, not just harder." Corporate 
Express Delivery Sys. v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 777, 780 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (emphasis added). This 
definition seems to focus on day-to-day substance over contractual form. 
202. See FedEx Ground Names Entrepreneurs of the Year, supra note 132 (describing 
exemplary FedEx contractors). 
203. See, e.g., ROBERT A. GORMAN & MATTHEW W. FINKIN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR 
LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 277–78 (2d ed. 2004) (noting the 
categorical invalidity of "yellow dog" contracts, in which employees agreed as a condition of 
employment not to subsequently join a union, under the NLRA). Although briefly held by 
the Supreme Court to be constitutionally protected expressions of liberty of contract, the 
yellow dog contract is an unenforceable interference with an employee’s right to be free 
from coercion or discrimination in selecting union representation. See id. (summarizing 
legal history of such contracts); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 34 
(1937) ("[T]he prohibition by Congress of interference with the selection of representatives 
for the purpose of negotiation and conference between employers and employees, instead of 
being an invasion of the constitutional right of either, was based on the recognition of the 
rights of both." (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
204. See, e.g., Local 814, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 512 F.2d 564, 566–67 
(D.C. Cir. 1975) (finding that the NLRA prohibited the employer from classifying owner-
operator truckers as employees in a collective bargaining unit if they were not employees 
under the statute, despite the fact that the classification was a result of a bargained agreement 
with the union). 
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parties as evidenced in an employment contract or independent contractor 
agreement is presently balanced as one factor in the common law test, it 
receives no special weight.205  Granting less significance to contractual 
potential is particularly appropriate in situations where workers’ lack of 
bargaining power—the precise issue which compels them to seek union 
representation—precludes them from negotiating contracts that would 
unequivocally declare them employees.206 
B. Worker-by-Worker Analysis Is Justified by Current Law and Would 
Lead to More Logical Results 
Judge Garland, dissenting in part in FedEx Home Delivery, noted that 
"few operators seized any of the opportunities that allegedly were available 
to them."207  Yet some contractors do build small enterprises within the 
FedEx structure, like "Entrepreneur of the Year" Nick Ciardiello, who 
"owns and operates 16 routes, maintains a fleet of 30 vehicles and employs 
34 people."208  FedEx contractor Jason Keefe, who employs seven drivers 
for "his FedEx Home Delivery [b]usiness,"209  likely signed a contract 
similar or identical to the one involved in FedEx Home Delivery.210  Such 
examples, along with the three Wilmington drivers who had multiple 
205. See Saveland, supra note 23, at 106–07 (noting that the intent of the parties "factor 
is accorded no greater weight than the others"). 
206. But see Local 814, 512 F.2d at 570 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in 
part). In Local 814, Chief Judge Bazelon speculated that if a union represented employee 
drivers but was precluded by Section 2(3) from including independent contractor drivers as 
members, "[t]he union’s apparent remedy under the . . . NLRB is to organize the owner-
operators, to force an alteration in the contracts between the operators and [the company] 
and thereby create an ‘employee’ status." Id. This proposal is inadequate, however, in that 
owner-operators found to be independent contractors by definition lack the statutory right to 
organize and bargain collectively for reclassification. See Kennedy, supra note 157, at 169– 
78 (discussing the labor exemption under the Clayton Act and, generally, the operation of 
antitrust law in relation to independent contractors). 
207. See FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 516 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
(Garland, J., dissenting in part) (criticizing the majority’s focus on entrepreneurial potential). 
208. See FedEx Ground Names Entrepreneurs of the Year, supra note 132 (describing 
successful FedEx entrepreneurs). 
209. Id. 
210. See FedEx Home Delivery, N.L.R.B. Case Nos. 1-RC-22034, 22035, slip op. at 5 
(First Region, Sept. 20, 2006) (decision and direction of election), available at 
http://www.fedexdriverslawsuit.com/CaseOverview/administrative.html (follow "FedEx 
NLRB2006Local25Decision1-RC-22034-22035.doc" hyperlink) (discussing "corporate-
wide policies and the ‘Operating Agreement’ signed by FedEx Home contractors, which is 
identical nationwide"). 
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routes,211  certainly suggest that "there is no unwritten rule or invisible 
barrier preventing other drivers from likewise exercising their contractual 
right."212 
Nonetheless, the Board and the courts should reject the premise that 
they must classify all who work under a given contract identically when 
their actions create relationships which, under the principles of agency, 
merit different treatment. In situations like that of the FedEx Home 
Delivery drivers, in which most single-route drivers simply do not engage 
in significant entrepreneurial activities, adjudicators should not establish the 
employment status of one worker based on the actions of a coworker who 
has achieved a manager-like status of superior bargaining power vis-à-vis 
the company. In other words, the presence or absence of entrepreneurial 
activities among multi-route drivers who work alongside single-route 
deliverers (either in person or through the employees they hire and 
manage), should have little bearing on the nature of the relationship 
between the single-route workers and the employer. By structuring a 
relationship in which individual workers have some freedom to choose to 
operate a semi-autonomous business, companies like FedEx should be 
forced to assume the risk that some workers will, instead, maintain a 
relationship with the company more suited—both as a matter of common 
law and economic reality—to collective bargaining. 
The rights-based control test which dominated NLRA classifications 
"[f]or a time"213  was suited to categorical determinations, as the common 
law developed precisely to deal with an employer’s right to exercise control 
rather than its actual exercise.214  In the NLRA context, however, this focus 
on potential rather than reality led to widespread manipulation by 
employers willing to give up a token amount of contractual control in order 
211. See FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 517 (Garland, J., dissenting in part) ("In 
the instant case . . . no FedEx driver has another job or solicits business from his delivery 
customers, and only three have multiple routes." (citations omitted)). 
212. See id. at 502 (majority opinion) (quoting C.C. Eastern, Inc. v. NLRB, 60 F.3d 
855, 860 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
213. Id. at 496. 
214. See Local 777, Democratic Union Org. Comm., Seafarers Int’l Union v. NLRB, 
603 F.2d 862, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("It is the right and not the exercise of control which is 
the determining element." (internal quotation marks omitted)). This emphasis is thought to 
shift the burden of avoiding harm to the party in the best position to oversee the servant’s 
performance. See Harper, supra note 167, at 334 ("Imposing liability on a firm that has 
decided that its control over particular work is not efficient could induce the firm to engage 
in an inefficient level of monitoring."). 
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to gain independent contractor status for workers.215  Similarly, an 
overemphasis on hypothetical entrepreneurialism would give employers a 
new mechanism for "avoid[ing] compliance with social and labor 
legislation by exacting contracts from their labor force."216 	If 
entrepreneurial opportunity for risk and profit is to become the new 
touchstone of independent contractor status, the Board and the courts must 
seize this chance to correct the misplaced focus of the previous test. When 
an agreement grants workers some choice between entrepreneurial risk and 
the stability of employment, the courts should protect workers’ rights and 
prevent superficial contractual manipulation by distinguishing between the 
workers who voluntarily place themselves in one camp or the other. 
This sorting necessarily will require some reconsideration of which 
factors in fact demonstrate a genuine "significant entrepreneurial 
215. See Simulated Statutory Purposelessness, supra note 44, at 227 (criticizing a legal 
regime which "enables employers and judges to manipulate the appearance of control to 
deprive run-of-the-mill unskilled workers like newspaper street hawkers . . . of the right to 
self-organize"). For an illustration of a company’s willingness to dramatically restructure 
labor relations to accommodate technical legal tests, see Saveland, supra note 23, at 111–14 
(discussing Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 327 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2007)). In this class action suit by FedEx Ground drivers, the court applied a control-
based test to find full-time, single-work-area (SWA) drivers to be employees entitled to 
reimbursement for work-related expenses under California law. See Estrada, 64 Cal. Rptr. 
3d at 336 (discussing "FedEx’s control over every exquisite detail of the drivers’ 
performance). The response by FedEx was dramatic: 
FedEx decided in late 2007 that it would be moving to an all "multi-work area" 
("MWA") business model in California, and will thus not renew the contracts of 
more than 1,000 single work area contractors. The "California Transition 
program" provides certain financial incentives, between $25,000 to $81,000 to 
SWA drivers to either become MWA operators or leave FedEx altogether. 
FedEx acknowledged that it was taking this action in part because of the 
Estrada . . . decision, but it would not move forward with such a plan 
nationwide. 
Saveland, supra note 23, at 113 (footnotes omitted). More recently, FedEx has taken similar 
steps in Massachusetts following its $3 million settlement with Massachusetts Attorney 
General Martha Coakley’s Office over the company’s alleged misclassification of drivers 
under state law. Martin Luttrell, FedEx Plan for its Drivers Opposed, TELEGRAM & 
GAZETTE (Worcester, Ma.), Aug. 6, 2010, at B12. As part of an "ISP Transition," FedEx 
will now only deal with drivers in that state who become "Independent Service Providers" 
by incorporating and purchasing at least three routes. See Class Action Complaint at 6, 
Hayes v. FedEx Home Delivery, Civil Action No. 10 3088E (Mass. Sup. Ct. Aug. 4, 2010). 
The company will terminate all single-route drivers. Id. Drivers who will lose their jobs as 
a result have brought a class action suit against FedEx alleging retaliation for having 
challenged their independent contractor status. Id. at 1–2. 
216. See Cox, supra note 55, at 7 (pointing out the susceptibility of common-law 
employment concepts to unilateral employer manipulation). 
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS 	 349 
opportunity for gain or loss."217  The Board and courts should be guided in 
this endeavor by Professor Harper’s focus on a worker’s level of 
independent capital investment as a meaningful distinction between 
employees and independent contractors.218  As Professor Harper explains, 
package deliverers, taxi drivers, janitors, and nurses may have relatively 
small investments in their trucks, cars, tools, and supplies.219  Primarily, 
however, these workers rely upon and make productive the capital of a 
larger company, which has invested in a far larger delivery, dispatching, 
220 or referral system. 
Within this framework, most workers in the gray area between 
employee and independent contractor status have little true opportunity 
for entrepreneurial gain, and they risk little.221  Only through the 
acquisition of greater capital can a worker take on meaningful 
entrepreneurial risks and potential gains. Such capital investment could 
consist, for example, of a multi-route or multi-vehicle operation in the 
delivery or taxicab business, or the development of significant goodwill as 
an incorporated business entity.222  Further development and enumeration 
of such factors will require the Board’s careful examination of the 
meaning of entrepreneurial independence in the context of each work 
relationship that comes before it. Adjudicators should, however, closely 
scrutinize a company’s claim that long-term, integrated workers are 
entrepreneurs,223  which may require "piercing th[e] veil of entrepreneurial 
217. Corporate Express Delivery Sys. v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 777, 780 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
218. See Harper, supra note 167, at 342 ("Only those who sell their labor combined 
with a capital investment that could not be replicated by replacement workers should be 
excluded as operators of independent businesses under the NLRA."). 
219. See id. at 341 (providing examples of different workers frequently found to be 
independent contractors despite a lack of significant capital investment). 
220. See id. ("If the NLRA is to fulfill its promise of allowing workers to combine to 
capture a larger share of returns from the capital they help make productive, these facts 
should define delivery drivers as employees . . . ."). 
221. See Monica Langley, Disgruntled Drivers Deliver Trouble to FedEx, SUN-
SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Jan. 9, 2005, at 14E (presenting FedEx executive’s argument that 
drivers "take on the risk that their truck will break down or get damaged"). While starting an 
actual small business requires the owner to risk failure in exchange for the chance of 
success, see, e.g., Wayne Hogue, Starting a New Business Can Be a Real Gamble, TIMES 
(Shreveport, La.), May 3, 2007, at 8A ("Most new businesses fail."), the risks taken by an 
ordinary taxicab, delivery driver, or construction worker seem insignificant. 
222. See Harper, supra note 167, at 343 (proposing these factors). 
223. See Argix Direct, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. 1017, 1020 (2004) ("The burden is on the 
party asserting independent contractor status to show that the classifications in question are 
independent contractors."). 
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independence" that an innovative employer may create224  and determining 
whether purportedly entrepreneurial activities are, in reality, overly 
constrained.225 
Fortunately, the Board is well-qualified to carry out this analysis on a 
worker-by-worker basis. Although it may at first appear an onerous fact-
finding endeavor for the Board to distinguish among workers based on their 
individual entrepreneurialism, in reality the task should come down to 
sorting groups of workers who have in common certain entrepreneurial 
traits. Such categorization is much like the intensely fact-bound inquiry the 
Board already engages in to establish appropriate bargaining units.226  On a 
case-by-case basis, the Board examines groups or individual workers to 
determine whether they exhibit a community of interest that renders them a 
227 proper group for collective bargaining purposes. 
Similarly, the Board already closely scrutinizes the daily duties of 
small groups of employees to decide which ones function as supervisors 
and consequently are excluded from the NLRA’s coverage.228  In carrying 
out this investigation, the Board differentiates between "straw bosses," who 
may be granted theoretical managerial duties, and real supervisors, who 
actually exercise "genuine management prerogatives."229  Among those 
224. See Universal Worker Coverage, supra note 35, at 599 (discussing the dissent by 
Justice Douglas in L.A. Meat and Provision Drivers Union, Local 626 v. United States, 371 
U.S. 94, 109–11 (1962) (Douglas, J., dissenting)). 
225. See Saveland, supra note 23, at 105 ("[E]ven though FedEx looks for drivers with 
an ‘entrepreneurial spirit,’ the drivers[’] actual compensation is more determined by the 
number of packages they are assigned by the terminal manager on any given day, rather than 
any personal effort on their part or entrepreneurial ingenuity."); Stand Your Ground: The 
Official Website of the FedEx Ground/Home Delivery Drivers Nationwide Class Action 
Lawsuit, http://www.fedexdriverslawsuit.com/CaseOverview/myth.html (last visited Feb. 
16, 2011) ("Every year, FedEx increases per package and per stop settlement payments but 
reduces the core zone settlement payment in essence making it impossible for drivers to 
make more money.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
226. See GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 203, at 83–111 (providing an overview of the 
law of appropriate bargaining units). 
227. See, e.g., NLRB v. Action Auto., Inc., 469 U.S. 490, 494 (1985) (noting that the 
Board determines units based on "community of interest," to achieve a "cohesive unit . . . 
relatively free of conflicts of interest" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Pursuant to this 
standard, the Court upheld as reasonable the Board’s exclusion of several close family 
members of the business’s owners from bargaining units. See id. (noting broad Board 
discretion in the area). 
228. See, e.g., Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. 686, 699 (2006) (determining 
that, in a hospital employing 181 registered nurses, twelve specific nurses were supervisors 
under the NLRA and thus excluded from the statute’s coverage). 
229. See id. at 688 (discussing the definition of "supervisor" under the NLRA) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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who do engage in supervisory duties, the Board inquires even further to 
find any individuals who are not statutory supervisors because they do not 
spend a "regular and substantial portion of [their] work time performing 
supervisory functions."230  In Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., for example, the 
Board recently looked beyond a stipulation of the union and employer that 
all charge nurses at a hospital had the same level of supervisory authority, 
finding instead that the job in some areas required less independent 
judgment than in others, necessitating different legal results.231  The 
Board’s ability to carry out this meticulous, worker-by-worker analysis to 
determine supervisor status demonstrates that a similarly detailed 
investigation with regard to entrepreneurialism is entirely feasible. 
Finally, although such a discussion would not likely appear in a court’s 
decision, a brief examination of the policies which underlie labor law’s 
classification scheme demonstrates that worker-by-worker analysis is the 
only appropriate approach to entrepreneurial potential. The exclusion of 
independent contractors from the protections of labor and employment law 
must, on some level, be based on the conclusion that for genuinely 
independent business owners, such protections are either unnecessary, 
232 economically harmful to society, or both. Yet when individuals, though 
enjoying the right to build a small business, instead act, on a day-to-day 
basis, indistinguishably from employees with relation to a putative 
employer, collective action may become more desirable to the workers as it 
loses its potential for harmful monopolization of the open, competition-
driven market.233  Although the Board lacks the authority, under current 
law, to base its entire analysis on each worker’s entrepreneurial 
independence, this factor can, as the FedEx Home Delivery court asserted, 
serve as "an important animating principle by which to evaluate [the agency 
230. See id. at 694 (explaining that workers who do not spend regular and substantial 
time supervising are not considered supervisors). 
231. See id. at 698 (including emergency room charge nurses in union bargaining unit 
as non-supervisors because they did not "exercise independent judgment in making patient 
care assignments"). 
232. See Universal Worker Coverage, supra note 35, at 592 (contending that the Taft-
Hartley amendments to the NLRA’s coverage were aimed at small business owners because 
"Congress neither deemed small employers in need of state-sponsored union protection, nor 
wanted, for antitrust reasons, to permit unions to organize them"). 
233. See Harper, supra note 167, at 342 (discussing antitrust considerations which 
militate against allowing independent businesses to bargain collectively with their 
customers). 
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test’s] factors in cases where some factors cut one way and some the 
other."234 
VI. Conclusion 
In the end, legislative reform or changes in the Board’s decision-
making along the lines presented in this Note will work to the benefit of all 
workers in sectors of the economy prone to misclassification and 
confusion.235  Those individuals who are pleased to own and operate truly 
independent businesses should have no fear of losing the contractual 
freedoms they enjoy in the event that Congress expands coverage or the 
Board adopts a worker-by-worker entrepreneurialism standard. Assuming 
that the models adopted by companies like Microsoft,236  FedEx,237  and 
numerous smaller taxi and trucking concerns actually provide a competitive 
advantage beyond their capacity for avoiding taxes, employee benefits, and 
union recognition, such companies will undoubtedly leave their current 
policies in place.238  Only if independent contractor-reliant companies find 
the game no longer worth playing with the field leveled will these drivers 
be forced to sign on as employees or, after all, start an independent 
business. 
234. FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 497 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
235. See Harper, supra note 167, at 344–56 (discussing the need to also reformulate the 
definition of "employer" under the NLRA). It should be noted that meaningful labor law 
reform requires more than a redefinition of "employee." As the aftermath of Estrada made 
clear, see supra note 215 (discussing FedEx’s elimination of its relationship with single 
route drivers after that decision, meaning that most drivers’ direct employer would always be 
an intermediate multi-route independent contractor), reform of the joint employer doctrine is 
also needed to address the changing nature of the employment relationship in our economy. 
See Harper, supra note 167, at 345–46 (describing the use of subcontracting and leasing 
agencies to escape labor laws). This issue is, however, outside the scope of this Note. 
236. See generally Sean A. Andrade, Comment, Biting the Hand that Feeds You: How 
Federal Law Has Permitted Employers to Violate the Basic Rights of Farmworkers and How 
This Has Begun to Impact Other Industries, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 601 (2002) 
(discussing a successful class action suit by independent contractors for employee benefits in 
Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 1996)). 
237. See supra Part III.A (discussing FedEx’s use of the independent contractor model). 
238. See supra notes 19–22 and accompanying text (noting the competitive advantage 
of tax and benefits avoidance for firms relying on independent contractors). 
